Το Θεσμικό Πλαίσιο του ELA

“Από την έναρξη της χρηματοοικονομικής κρίσης και μετά και όποτε οι εμπορικές τράπεζες χρειάστηκαν να καταφύγουν στον μηχανισμό παροχής έκτακτης ρευστότητας δεν προηγήθηκαν ποτέ και σε καμία χώρα επίσημες ανακοινώσεις όπως συμβαίνει τις τελευταίες ημέρες στην Ελλάδα. Ούτε ποτέ ακολούθησε επίσημη ανακοίνωση από οποιαδήποτε αρχή είτε για τις ποιες τράπεζες είτε για το ύψος του ρευστότητας.



Κάτι τέτοιο θα ισοδυναμούσε για παράδειγμα με ανακοίνωση ότι σε τόσες ημέρες θα έχουμε τόσο τοις εκατό υποτίμηση. Η αιτία που δεν γίνονται ανακοινώσεις έχει από την μια σχέση με την ευστάθεια του τραπεζικού συστήματος και από την άλλη με μία σειρά από Μνημόνια Κατανόησης (Memorandums of Understanding) μεταξύ Κεντρικών Τραπεζών τα οποία και δεν είναι δημόσια έγγραφα.”



Νικόλαος Καρατσόρης|| Monetary Reform

University of Westminster

Ειδικότητα: International Business



Ένα κείμενο το οποίο δεν προσφέρεται για ανθρώπους που βαριούνται και αφορά το θεσμικό πλαίσιο του ELA, μια και έχει ανοίξει πάλι η συζήτηση. Όποιος φτάσει μέχρι το τέλος δεν κερδίζει τίποτε ...

Τα παρακάτω αποτελούν μέρος δικών μου σημειώσεων σε επικοινωνίες που είχα με φίλους στο εξωτερικό πριν από 2 χρόνια περίπου.
Το 90% από όσα διαβάσετε είναι τα αυθεντικά κείμενα νόμων και άλλων κειμένων της ΕΚΤ και της ΕΕ με παραπομπές και ελάχιστα σαρκαστικά σχόλια. Σχεδόν όλα είναι στα αγγλικά εκτός από μία ελληνική υπουργική απόφαση ...”

...........................................

01.11.1993 Protocol on the Statute of the European Systems of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank comes into force. [1], [2]

Article 14, National central banks

14.4. National central banks may perform functions other than those specified in this Statute unless the Governing Council finds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and liability of national central banks and shall not be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB.

April 2000 The ECB publishes its 1999 annual report [3]

1. The institutional framework for financial stability

“Co-ordination mechanisms are primarily called for within the Eurosystem. This is the case for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), which embraces the support given by central banks in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis to temporarily illiquid institutions and markets. At the outset, it is necessary to stress that the importance of ELA should not be overemphasised. Central bank support should not be seen as a primary means for ensuring financial stability, since it bears the risk of moral hazard. Preventive measures aimed at fostering the adoption of sound risk management practices on the part of financial institutions, and the effectiveness of prudential regulation and supervision in achieving this goal, are the first line of defence against excessive risk-taking behaviour and financial distress. Furthermore, the provision of ELA has been a very rare event in industrial countries over the past few decades, while other elements of the safety net have gained importance in the management of crises. However, if and when appropriate, the necessary mechanisms to tackle a financial crisis are in place. The main guiding principle is that the competent NCB takes the decision concerning the provision of ELA to an institution operating in its jurisdiction. This would take place under the responsibility and at the cost of the NCB in question. Mechanisms ensuring an adequate flow of information are in place in order that any potential liquidity impact can be managed in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the appropriate single monetary policy stance. The agreement on ELA is internal to the Eurosystem and therefore does not affect the existing arrangements between central banks and supervisors at the national level or bilateral and multilateral co-operation among supervisors and between the latter and the Eurosystem. However, their smooth functioning assumes an ability to implement, swiftly and efficiently, co-ordination mechanisms aimed at dealing with the cross-border implications of financial crises and at preventing contagion.

Multilateral co-operation in the field of prudential supervision within the various sectors of financial activity is also well established through the operation of several committees. In the banking sector, besides the second function of the BSC, the Groupe de Contact has been operating since 1972.

(Σημείωση, όσοι θέλετε να ασχοληθείτε σοβαρά με το θέμα του ELA θα πρέπει να δείτε πώς είναι δομημένη η θεσμικά συνεργασία των Κεντρικών Τραπεζών, και εκεί θα ανοίξουν καινούριοι ορίζοντες, beyond your wildest dreams … )

17.04.2001 Report on financial crisis management, by the Economic and Financial Committee (July 2001) [4]

The Brouwer Reports recommends: pp. 30-31

Supervisory authorities should further develop MoUs to deal more concretely with issues related to crisis management. Procedures for information exchange when a major financial institution runs into trouble should be agreed upon in advance, whilst recognising the interests of other authorities involved and allowing for the necessary flexibility to cope with each specific case. The relevant fora, such as the BSC [Banking Supervision Committee] and the GdC [Groupe de Contact], could be requested to describe the main elements for such procedures. Supervisors should also consider extending MoUs into agreements among competent authorities of a number of EU-countries, or non-EU-countries, particularly where the structure of specific institutions demands so. Competition authorities are called upon to maintain timely and robust procedures for considering the competitive implications of crisis management measures.”

10.03.2003 Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation between the banking supervisors and central banks of the European Union in crisis management situations, signed by the Bank of Greece. [5]

The MOU states:

The MoU, which is not a public document, consists of a set of principles and procedures for cross-border co-operation between banking supervisors and central banks in crisis situations. These principles and procedures deal specifically with the identification of the authorities responsible for crisis management, the required flows of information between all the involved authorities and the practical conditions for sharing information at the cross-border level. The MoU also provides for the setting-up of a logistical infrastructure to support the enhanced cross-border co-operation between authorities.

The framework defined in the MoU will apply in crisis situations with a possible cross-border impact involving individual credit institutions or banking groups, or relating to disturbances in money and financial markets and/or market infrastructures (including payments infrastructures) with potential common implications for Member States. Co-operation will take the form required by the specific features of the crisis and with regard to all the relevant supervisory and central banking tasks and functions, and will be consistent with the necessary flexibility of action of each of the authorities involved.”

18.05.2005 Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis situations, [6]

April 2006 The ECB publishes its 2005 AnnualReport [7]

1.2 COOPERATION IN FINANCIAL CRISIS SITUATIONS

The EU framework for cooperation between the competent authorities in the area of financial crisis management was further enhanced in 2005.

First, in May the banking supervisors, central banks and finance ministries of the EU agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in financial crisis situations, which entered into force on 1 July. The MoU – which was adopted under the aegis of the Economic and Financial Committee – applies to crisis situations with a potential for both cross-border and systemic consequences affecting credit institutions, banking groups or banking components of financial groups, as well as to other systemic disturbances withcross-border implications in the financial markets, including those affecting payment systems or other market infrastructures. The principles and procedures contained in the MoU deal with the sharing of information, views and assessments among authorities and with cooperation at the national and cross-border level. In order to further support the enhanced cooperation between authorities, the MoU also includes arrangements for the development of contingency plans for the management of crisis situations, along with stress-testing and simulation exercises. The MoU itself will be tested in a crisis simulation exercise planned for 2006.

Second,further enhancements of the crisis management framework, in terms of central banking and supervisory practices for handling financial crises at the cross-borderlevel, were jointly considered by the BSC and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors(CEBS).



Νικόλαος Καρατσόρης|| Monetary Reform

University of Westminster

Ειδικότητα: International Business



December 2006 The ECB publishes the Financial StabilityReview [8]

MEMORANDAOF UNDERSTANDING ON COOPERATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL

The Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on crisis management are now important components of the EU’s institutional framework for safeguarding financial stability.

….

There are currently two multilateral MoUs on crisis management in force which have been adoptedby the responsible authorities of all EU Member States. The MoUs are not legally binding and are based on the principle of voluntary cooperation, as they are without prejudice to the exercise of statutory responsibilities by the relevant authorities.

Followingup on the 2001 EFC recommendations, thefirst EU-wide MoU on cooperation in crisis management situations was adopted under the auspices of the ESCB’s Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) in March 2003, entitled the “Memorandum of Understanding on High- Level Principles on Co-operation between the BankingSupervisors and Central Banks of the EU in Crisis Management Situations”.

This MoU was designed to contribute to effective crisis management by ensuring smooth interaction between the authorities concerned, thus facilitating an early assessment of the systemic scope of a crisis both at the domestic and EU levels. For this purpose the aforementioned MoU sets out specific principles and procedures for the identification of the authorities responsible for crisis management in the EU, the required flows of information between banking supervisors and centralbanks, and the practical conditions for sharing information at the cross-border level. It also establishes an infrastructure for cross-border communication between banking supervisors and central banks, including a list of emergency contacts.

Following up on the priorities set by the EFC in 2004 mentioned above, the second MoU on cooperation in financial crisis situations, entitleda “Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the EU in Financial Crisis Situations”,was adopted by the 76 EU banking supervisors, central banks and finance ministries under the aegis of the EFC in May 2005.

This MoU consists of a set of principles and procedures for sharing information, views and assessments, in order to assist these authorities in pursuing the irrespective policy functions and to preserve the overall stability of the financial system of individual Member States and of the EU as a whole. In particular, the authorities concerned should be in a position, if needed, to engage in informed discussions amongst themselves at the cross-border level through existing networks and committees, for example following the emergence of a crisis situation that affects the financial system of more than one Member State or the EU as a whole.

To support further the enhanced cooperation between authorities, the 2005 MoU also includes arrangements for the development of contingency plans for the management of crisis situations, along with stress-testing and simulation exercises.

Lastly, the MoU includes an explicit statement that it should not be construed as representing an exception to (i) the principle of the firm’s owners’/shareholders’ primary financial responsibility, (ii) the need for creditor vigilance, and(iii) the primacy of market-led solutions when it comes to solving crisis situationsin individual institutions.

In addition to the MoUs on crisis management, an MoUis also in place regarding cooperation between banking supervisors and central banks in their capacity as overseers of the payment system, which entered into force in January 2001. Although this agreement does not specifically focus on crisis management, it does contain a number of relevant provisions dealing with the transmission of information in case of liquidity or solvency problems. This relates to the risk that the inability of a market participant to meet its obligations in a large-value payment system could jeopardise its counterparties’ ability to meet their obligations at short notice, which therefore represents a relevant source of contagion.

One of the specific tools available to central banks in a crisis situation is the provision of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to individual banks. Generally, this tool consists of the support given by central banks in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by case basis to temporarily illiquid institutions and markets. This support may be warranted to ease an institution’s liquidity strains, as well as to prevent any potential systemic effects, or specific implications such as disruption of the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems. However, the importance of ELA should not be overemphasised. Central bank support should not be seen as a primary means of ensuring financial stability, since it bears the risk of moral hazard. Furthermore, ELA rarely needs to be provided, and is thus less significant than other elements of the financial safety net, which have increased in importance in the management of crises.

….

Within the specific setting of the Eurosystem, the necessary mechanisms to tackle a financial crisis are in place.

….

Second, the Eurosystem also has procedures in place regarding the provision of ELA by the individual Eurosystem NCBs. Since ELA is not a Eurosystem function, the decision concerning its provision lies with the competent NCB regarding an institution operating in its jurisdiction. The Eurosystem procedures ensure an adequate flow of information so that any potential liquidity impact can be managed in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the appropriate single monetary policy stance. These procedures on ELA are internal to the Eurosystem, but their smooth functioning is also linked to the wider arrangements at the EU level for dealing with the cross-border implications of financial crises.

February 2007 ECB Monthly Bulletin February 2007 [9]

3.3 THE CENTRAL BANKING FRAMEWORK

In a potential financial crisis situation, central banks have an important role to play as monetary authorities and in the context of their responsibility for contributing to the smooth functioning of payment systems and to the safeguarding of financial system stability.

...

One of the specific tools available to central banks in a crisis situation is the provision of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to individual credit institutions against adequate collateral. Generally, this tool consists of providing liquidity support in exceptional circumstances to a temporarily illiquid credit institution which cannot obtain liquidity through either the market or participation in monetary policy operations. This exceptional and temporary liquidity provision should respect the prohibition of monetary financing embodied in the Treaty establishing the European Community and the associated EU Council Regulation. A credit institution cannot, however, assume automatic access to central bank liquidity. As a central banking function, the provision of ELA is within the discretion of the national central bank, which will consider the relevant factors that may justify the access to this lending of last resort. Specifically, the provision of ELA may be justified to prevent or mitigate potential systemic effects on financial institutions, including repercussions for market infrastructure such as the disruption of payment and settlement systems. Central bank liquidity support should not be seen as a primary means of managing financial crises, since it is limited to the temporary provision of liquidity in very exceptional circumstances. Hence if, despite preventive arrangements, a crisis at a financial institution occurs, a private sector solution is preferable whenever possible. When such private solutions are deemed insufficient or impossible, the relevant components of the financial safety net could be considered, such as specific supervisory measures, recourse to the deposit insurance schemes and ultimately the winding down of the institution concerned.

The cooperation between EU central banks in a cross-border crisis situation will be facilitated, where warranted, by the procedures set out in the EU-wide and regional MoUs. In particular, the envisaged procedures will support the sharing of information on emerging financial disturbances, the assessment of potential systemic implications, and the coordination of policy action, if deemed necessary, between central banks, as well as between central banks and other authorities.

Within the specific setting of the Eurosystem, the necessary mechanisms to tackle a financial crisis are in place.

...

Second, the Eurosystem also has procedures in place regarding the provision of ELA to individual credit institutions in the euro area, which are under the responsibility of the national central banks (NCBs). These procedures are aimed at ensuring an adequate flow of information within the Eurosystem to the decision-making bodies of the ECB. In this way, the impact of an ELA intervention on aggregate liquidity conditions in the euro area can be managed in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the appropriate single monetary policy stance.

25.03.2011 Money Market Contact Group Discussion [10]

“Answering a general question regarding the provision of ELA, Paul [Mercier] recalled that the Statute explicitly allows NCBs to conduct transactions on their own behalf, such as emergency liquidity assistance or investments transactions, as long as these do not interfere with the implementation of the single monetary policy (i.e. the approval of the Governing Council would be needed). He underlined that possible emergency liquidity support to local banks was not a Eurosystem activity and fell under the responsibilities of national central banks.”



Νικόλαος Καρατσόρης|| Monetary Reform

University of Westminster

Ειδικότητα: International Business



06.05.2011 Εκδίδεται στην Ελλάδα η Υπουργική Απόφαση Αριθμ. 2/43219/0025 ΦΕΚ Β 1143/06.06.2011 για την «Παροχή της εγγύησης του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου στην Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος για κάλυψη πιστώσεων σε τράπεζες που εδρεύουν στην Ελλάδα»

«Έχοντας υπόψη:

3. Τις διατάξεις του ν. 2322/95 ιδίως το άρθρο 1 (ΦΕΚΑ/143/06−07−1995). (Μάμα μία, ένας νόμος μα τι νόμος!)

6. Την με αρ. 24/01−06−2011 απόφαση Διυπουργικής Επιτροπής του άρθρου 5 του Ν. 2322/1995, αποφασίζουμε:

Παρέχουμε την εγγύηση του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου στην Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος για κάλυψη πιστώσεων σε τράπεζες που εδρεύουν στην Ελλάδα και παραμένουν φερέγγυες, με σκοπό την αντιμετώπιση προσωρινών προβλημάτων ρευστότητας, μέχρι του συνολικού ποσού των δέκα πέντε δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ (€ 15.000.000.000). Το εν λόγω ποσό μπορεί να αυξάνεται με απόφαση του Υπουργού Οικονομικών.

Με την ανωτέρω εγγύηση ασφαλίζονται, χωρίς άλλη διατύπωση, όλες οι απαιτήσεις της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος από συμβάσεις παροχής πίστωσης, οι οποίες θα καταρτιστούν μεταξύ της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος και τραπεζών που εδρεύουν στην Ελλάδα κατά το χρονικό διάστημα από την 1 Ιουνίου 2011 έως 30 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011, το οποίο μπορεί να παρατείνεται με απόφαση του Υπουργού Οικονομικών. … Στις συμβάσεις παροχής πίστωσης περιλαμβάνονται ιδίως συμβάσεις δανείου καθώς και συμβάσεις πώλησης, με σύμφωνο επαναγοράς, στοιχείων του ενεργητικού του συμβαλλόμενου πιστωτικού ιδρύματος.

Για την παροχή της εγγύησης του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου, η Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος πρέπει να λαμβάνει επαρκείς ασφάλειες από τις τράπεζες ίσης τουλάχιστον αξίας με τη χορηγούμενη πίστωση. Εφόσον προς εξασφάλιση των απαιτήσεων της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος παρασχεθούν ασφάλειες που δεν μεταβιβάζονται αυτοδίκαια στο Ελληνικό Δημόσιο ως εκδοχέα, η Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος θα συμπράττει για τη μεταβίβαση τους στο Ελληνικό Δημόσιο.»

(Σημείωση: Αυτή είναι η αρχή του ELA στην Ελλάδα. Οι τράπεζες φαίνεται να ξεκινούν να αντλούν ρευστότητα τον Ιούνιο του 2011 με εγγύηση του Ελληνικού δημοσίου στηριγμένη στον νόμο 2322/1995. Είναι ο ίδιος νόμος με βάση τον οποίο εγγυήσεις σε ΔΕΚΟ πέρασαν στο δημόσιο χρέος και αυτό εκτινάχθηκε το 2009 … Για να μην γράφω όλη την ιστορία, η παραπάνω υπουργική απόφαση κυρώνεται με ΠΝΠ ΦΕΚ Α’ 203/14.09.2011 και επικυρώνεται με το άρθρο πρώτο του 4031/2011. Τελικά με το άρθρο 80 του 4071//2013 τα ποσά των εγγυήσεων φθάνουν τα 90 δις. A, ναι, o ELA θέλει εγγύηση τα δάνεια σας ... αλήθεια, εκείνα τα 14 δις που εχει ακόμη η ΤτΕ εκτός ισολογισμού τί είναι άραγε; Αν υποψιαστώ ότι είναι της ΑΤΕ θα πεθαάνω, αλά 10 μικρούς Μήτσους ... )

24.04.2012 Accounting Reclassification [11]

“In the week ending 20 April 2012, an accounting reclassification took place in order to harmonise the disclosure of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) provided by Eurosystem central banks to domestic credit institutions under other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro (asset item 6). This mainly explains the decrease of other securities (asset item 7.2) by EUR 18.5 billion, the decrease of other assets (asset item 9) by EUR 105.6 billion as well as the increase of other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro (asset item 6) by EUR 121.1 billion.”

Σημείωση: Μέχρι τότε φαίνεται να επικρατεί λογιστικό μπάχαλο με τον ELA … Μελετήστε τους ισολογισμούς της ΤτΕ πριν και μετά τον Απρίλιο του 2012

27.02.2013 The European banking union – first steps on a long march [12]

“At the same time, the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) provided by the national central banks was used more intensively. Although this is carried out by the national central banks at their own risk and for their own account, it might lead to tensions between the national and European levels of monetary policy, which would not be sustainable. A renationalization of the monetary architecture would not be effective.”

17.10.2013 ECB publishes rules of procedure for the ELA [13]

In the event of the overall volume of the ELA operations envisaged for a given financial institution or group of financial institutions (on a consolidated basis and including its foreign branches) exceeding a threshold of €500 million, the NCB(s) involved must inform the ECB as early as possible prior to the extension of the intended assistance.

In the event of the overall volume of the ELA operations envisaged being expected to exceed a threshold of €2 billion, the Governing Council considers whether there is a risk that the ELA involved may interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem.

.........................................

Με αυστηρούς όρους δεν υπάρχει κάτι άλλο για τον ELA. Αυτό που θα πρέπει κάποιος να μελετήσει στο πώς φτάσαμε στον ELA είναι οι αλλαγές του θεσμικού πλαισίου στην ΕΕ περί του ανταγωνισμού μεταξύ των πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων. [14]

Για να πω και το συνωμοσιολογικό μου, εάν πραγματικά θέλετε να καταλάβετε πώς φτάσαμε έως εδώ, πώς φτάσαμε στα MoUs των Κεντρικών Τραπεζιτών, θα πρέπει να γυρίστε πολύ πίσω στην ιστορία. Πρέπει φιλελεύθεροι μου να γυρίσετε πίσω σε μία αποφράδα ημέρα του Μάϊου του 1925 και στην πρώτη επίσημη συνάντηση Κεντρικών Τραπεζιτών στο Παρίσι. Συμμετείχε κι η Ελλάδα μέσω της Εθνικής ... Αυτή θα σας οδηγήσει πίσω στην Συνθήκη των Βερσαλλιών ... Εάν φυσικά καταφέρατε να διαβάσετε μέχρι εδώ τους νόμους ....



Νικόλαος Καρατσόρης|| Monetary Reform

University of Westminster

Ειδικότητα: International Business



ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΕΙΣ:

[1] http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html

[2]https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/pdf/orga/escbstatutes_en.pdf??23e3230a2693935abdf505f2c8d0aa9b

[3] page98, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar1999en.pdf

[4] http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication908_en.pdf

[5] http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030310_3.en.html#ftn.fn1

[6] http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html

[7] pp. 120-121, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2005en.pdf

[8]pp. 167-174, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview200612en.pdf??a26f4bc9093173998888fa2693f6ccc6

[9] pp. 80-81, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb200702en.pdf

[10]http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/mmcg/summary_201110314.pdf?f24ce7de70e1efc0473e7333563a3145

[11] http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/wfs/2012/html/fs120424.en.html

[12] http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130227_1.en.html

[13]http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/elaprocedures.en.pdf?18e839daea2cecc9fa485ca84cff4bce

[14] http://numismaticreform.blogspot.gr/2013/11/blog-post.html




Νικόλαος Καρατσόρης|| Monetary Reform

University of Westminster

Ειδικότητα: International Business